Two methods of a utility class in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP allows an attacker with high privileges and has direct access to SAP System, to inject code when executing with transaction (SE24 – Class Builder).

This could allow execution of arbitrary commands on the operating system, that could highly impact the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the system.

Command Injection, OS command injection, CVE-2021-44235

The following releases of component SAP_BASIS are affected

7.00 SP14-SP39 / 7.01 SP00-SP24 / 7.10 SP22-SP25 / 7.11 SP17-SP20 / 7.02 SP01-SP24 / 7.30 SP13-SP21 / 7.31 SP01-SP30 /
7.40 SP05-SP27 / 7.50 SP00-SP22 / 7.51 SP00-SP13 / 7.52 SP00-SP09 / 7.53 SP00-SP07 / 7.54 SP00-SP05 / 7.55 SP00-SP03 /
7.56 SP00-SP01

The user has permissions to use SE24/SE80 and execute development objects (authorization object = S_DEVELOP with fields OBJTYPE = CLAS and ACTVT = 16 ‘Execute’).

The compromised utility class is exclusively used for license bound SAP tool Post-Copy Automation (PCA) and has no impact on standard functionality.

With the fix the functionality is completely removed and directly integrated into the class where it is executed without the possibility to pass any parameter.

Option 1:

No action is needed when the user has no permission to execute development objects (authorization object = S_DEVELOP with fields OBJTYPE = CLAS and ACTVT = 16 ‘Execute’) through transactions SE24/SE80.

Option 2:

Implement the note with SNOTE to remove the coding. As the functionality is used for Post-Copy Automation (PCA) which is integated into SAP Basis for older releases/sps some dependent notes have to be implemented.